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Interpersonal disagreement has been linked to a variety of democratic outcomes, and classic theories of social inﬂuence
place it at the heart of opinion formation. We examine the relationship between exposure to disagreement and in-
formation seeking during elections, while developing and testing a theory of heterogeneous effects based on recent work
on personality and discussion (e.g., Gerber et al. 2012). Using a simulated campaign experiment (Lau and Redlawsk
2006) and data from the 2008–9 ANES panel study, we ﬁnd consistent evidence that personality conditions responses
to disagreement in expected ways—it enhances effects for those with certain traits, while suppressing it for those with
others. We close by reﬂecting on this pattern of results, discussing broader implications while moving toward a more
general theory of social inﬂuence.
Social scientists have long placed political communi-cation at the center of democratic politics. One im-portant type of communication comes in interper-
sonal discussion (Downs 1957; Katz and Lazarsfeld 1955),
particularly as it involves exposure to different points of
view (Lazarsfeld, Berelson, and Gaudet 1968). Indeed, the
study of socially supplied political disagreement has deep
roots (see, e.g., Zuckerman 2005) and has been linked to a
variety of behavioral outcomes (e.g., Klofstad, Sokhey, and
McClurg 2013; Sinclair 2012), including higher propensities
to vote across party lines (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995).
Although scholars have long posited that disagreement
has important political consequences, Mutz’s works (2002a,
2002b, 2006) have advanced this point especially forcefully,
arguing that interpersonal disagreement presents a mix of
positive and negative results—a “democratic dilemma”—
for the mass public, simultaneously promoting levels of tol-
erance while suppressing levels of political participation.
Others have helped keep attention focused squarely on dis-
agreement, even while striking a less cautionary tone about
its role in democratic functioning (e.g., Huckfeldt, Johnson,
and Sprague 2004) or positing that any deleterious effects
on participation may be minimal (Nir 2005), conditional
(Bello 2012; Nir 2011), potentially reversed (Jang 2009), or
countered by discussant expertise (McClurg 2006a).
At present, the consequences of disagreement remain
the subject of intense scholarly debate. We join this con-
versation but follow recent efforts in recognizing the po-
tential for heterogeneous effects. While the literature has
noted that social inﬂuence works differently based on the
interplay of individual choice and constraint (Klofstad et al.
2013; McClurg 2006b; Sokhey and Djupe 2011), much of
the work in this vein focuses on the construction of social
“barriers” with respect to coercive environments, such as
those in majority/minority contexts (Finifter 1974; Huck-
feldt and Sprague 1995; McClurg 2006a). We advance a
conditional approach that stresses the contribution of in-
dividual traits in moderating interpersonal disagreement
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(see Testa, Hibbing, and Ritchie [2014] for complementary
work using conﬂict avoidance). Such a perspective can help
us make sense of mixed ﬁndings regarding disagreement,
for it points not toward uniformly positive or negative ef-
fects in the electorate. Rather, it raises the possibility that
disagreement may be more (less) important for some and
underscores the need for nuanced understandings of con-
ditional effects.
We focus our efforts on understanding how personality
constrains social inﬂuence. Personality is a relatively static
trait within individuals that potentially guides a host of
political attitudes and behaviors (Mondak 2010; Winter and
Barembaum 1999), including political discussion (Gerber et al.
2012; Hibbing, Ritchie, and Anderson 2011; Mondak 2010;
Mondak et al. 2010). Scholars have long recognized the po-
tential for heterogeneity in responses to disagreement (for
a discussion, see Ahn, Huckfeldt, and Ryan 2014) and con-
sidered treatments of conﬂict avoidance (e.g., Mutz 2006), in-
cluding recent examinations of positive orientations to con-
ﬂict (Testa et al. 2014). However, we know less about how
personality traits affect the relative impact of disagreement,
even if scholars have linked certain personality types to ex-
posure to it (e.g., Mondak et al. 2010).
The existing literature raises the possibility that person-
ality traits function as key moderators of social inﬂuence
(Gerber et al. 2012). For certain personality types, disagree-
ment may drive information seeking (McPhee, Ferguson,
and Smith 1963; Sprague 1982) or produce ambivalence
(Mutz 2002b, 2006); for others, effects may be reversed or
nonexistent. For example, agreeable individuals prioritize the
maintenance of social harmony and the avoidance of dis-
cord, while extroverted individuals relish social interactions
of all kinds. One can imagine that these two types of indi-
viduals approach and respond to political discussions in di-
verging ways—this simple contrast suggests that responses
to disagreement are likely to be heterogeneous. In this article
we argue that personality helps to explain varied reactions,
adding important qualiﬁcations to existing perspectives on
the democratic consequences of “informal” deliberation (e.g.,
Jacobs, Cook, and Delli Carpini 2009; Mutz 2006).
We employ an experimental design uniquely suited to
addressing these questions, before considering the external
validity of our results using the 2008–9 ANES panel study.
Our experimental treatment randomly primes political dis-
agreement (McClurg, Sokhey, and Seib 2011) before a sim-
ulated campaign (Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 2006). When we
pair this with measures of the “Big 5” personality traits, we
gain leverage not only on the potential causal effects of in-
terpersonal discussion but on how different types of people
respond to primes tapping socially supplied disagreement.
Between the experimental and survey results, we ﬁnd con-
sistent evidence that personality moderates the relationship
between disagreement and political information seeking.
For some interpersonal disagreement seems to drive infor-
mation acquisition, while for others, it produces largely differ-
ent (sometimes null) consequences.
DISAGREEMENT AND ELECTORAL
INFORMATION SEEKING
Interpersonal disagreement has been linked to a wide range
of behaviors and attitudes, such as participation (McClurg
2006b; Mutz 2006) and candidate evaluations (Huckfeldt
et al. 2004; Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995). Here we focus on a
fundamental aspect of democratic citizenship: information
seeking about politics. Our approach is informed by the in-
formation search process central to McPhee et al.’s (1963)
classic model of social inﬂuence. This model begins as an
individual receives information about politics (e.g., a mes-
sage about candidates), which leads to an initial preference.
The individual then checks her preference with members of
her network. If the individual ﬁnds agreement, she has no
reason to look for additional information and the process of
consultation ends; if she encounters disagreement, it creates
uncertainty about her preference and the process continues.
The principal implication of this model is that those expe-
riencing disagreement in their social network question their
prior beliefs and therefore engage in additional search be-
havior and interaction—disagreement drives information
acquisition.
There is a large literature that builds on this model of
social inﬂuence (e.g., Ahn et al. 2014; Huckfeldt et al. 2004;
Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995; McClurg 2003). We advance
this approach by taking the idea of social interaction and
focusing not on how disagreement drives subsequent net-
work engagement but on how exposure to interpersonal
disagreement affects more general patterns of information-
seeking behavior during campaigns. As information seeking
is perhaps the most important characteristic in assessing
the quality of political behavior (Lau and Redlawk 2006), it
is important to understand the conditions that trigger the
process. Recent work ﬁnds that individual traits such as
orientations toward conﬂict condition the effects of dis-
agreement (Testa et al. 2014); here we speak to these efforts,
exploring different outcomes and individual moderators. To
what degree do personality traits exaggerate (mute) social
pressures when it comes to information seeking?
Of course, our focus on this question raises several ad-
ditional points. First, what do we mean by the term “infor-
mation seeking”? Conceptually, we follow the work of Lau
and Redlawsk (2006, 32): information is anything (e.g., party
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afﬁliations, issue positions, candidate backgrounds, etc.) that
might be used to make a political decision. “Information-
seeking behavior” then refers to what individuals do to con-
trol the amount and nature of the information they obtain.
Empirically, political scientists have many indirect measures
that are related to the concept, such as individuals’ expressed
“interest in information” during elections. A more satisfac-
tory measure might record the actual information that peo-
ple look at as they navigate the candidates, issues, events, and
polls of a campaign. In the analyses that follow, we employ
both approaches.
Second, why focus on personality? While examining the
relationship between network disagreement and informa-
tion seeking speaks to established models of social inﬂuence
(e.g., McPhee et al. 1963; see also Sprague 1982), such a
focus only takes us so far in addressing the (mixed) state of
the literature when it comes to the effects of disagreement.
To help resolve current debates we need to take the less
common step of presenting an “integrative framework”—
one that simultaneously incorporates the “three pillars of
behavior of behavior—elements of the environment, indi-
viduals’ basic traits, and interactions between traits and the
environment” (Mondak et al. 2010, 85).
Personality traits are a good place to look when it comes
to individual moderators of social effects; they identify dif-
ferences between individuals that predispose them to think
and behave divergently. Personality traits may cultivate and
inﬂuence the formation of ideology (Carney et al. 2008;
Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling, and Ha 2010; Mondak
2010), partisanship (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling
2010), issue attitudes (Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling,
and Ha 2010; Mondak and Halpernin 2008), and the de-
cision to vote (Gallego and Oberski 2011; Gerber, Huber,
Doherty, and Dowling 2010; Mondak 2010; Mondak and
Halpernin 2008). Important for our purposes, evidence
suggests that personality traits predispose individuals to
seek and obtain information about politics in different ways
(Gerber, Huber, Doherty, and Dowling 2010). Personality
may drive some individuals to seek speciﬁc sources for
political discussion, while it may drive others to avoid the
same contacts (Hibbing et al. 2011; Mondak 2010; Mondak
et al. 2010). Notably, personality may predispose citizens to
discuss politics more (less) in response to the distribution
of disagreement within their networks (Gerber et al. 2012).
PERSONALITY, DISAGREEMENT,
AND POLITICAL BEHAVIOR
The “Big 5” personality types—conscientiousness, openness
to experience, extroversion, emotional stability, and agree-
ableness—have been increasingly linked to a host of po-
litical attitudes and behaviors, including the ways in which
people interact, behave, and are inﬂuenced (Gerber, Huber,
Doherty, and Dowling 2010, 2011; Gerber, Huber, Doherty,
Dowling, and Ha 2010; Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dowling,
Raso, and Ha 2011; Gerber et al. 2012; Hibbing et al. 2011;
Jost 2006; Jost et al. 2003; Mondak 2010; Mondak and Hal-
pernin 2008; Mondak et al. 2010). Mondak (2010) describes
personality as the individual’s “central tendency,” noting that
there are fundamental differences between people that pre-
dispose them to approach the political world differently.
There are several components to the narrative with respect
to disagreement, personality, and information seeking. It
is important to underscore that we conceptualize this as a
story about the ways in which personality moderates the ef-
fects of disagreement on information seeking; we focus less
on the direct relationship between personality and political
discussion (Hibbing et al. 2011; Mondak 2010).
Individuals who score highly in terms of the personality
trait “openness to experience” are often characterized as
being willing to seek out novel information, as having rel-
atively weak attachments to prior convictions, and as en-
joying cognitively demanding situations and interactions
(Mondak 2010). There is evidence that openness to expe-
rience results in more discussion and larger social networks
(Mondak et al. 2010) but not necessarily more information
seeking from sources such as the media (Mondak 2010) or
more inﬂuence from social sources (Hibbing et al. 2011).
That said, some work suggests that openness also results in
a tendency to avoid frequent discussion with those who
hold dissimilar views (Gerber et al. 2012). Overall, then, it
seems that such individuals are prone to seeking new in-
formation but are also predisposed to avoid disagreement.
While it is hard to say how such a predisposition will struc-
ture reactions to disagreement, the tendency to seek and to
be open to new information leads us to believe that, on
balance, information seeking will be the outcome. Thus, we
expect these characteristics to result in enhanced suscepti-
bility to social inﬂuence—that means engaging in greater
information-seeking behavior (as gauged by a deeper search).
The extroverted individual is characterized as being out-
going, talkative, and participatory (Mondak 2010). Extro-
verted citizens appear to engage in more information seek-
ing from media sources (Mondak 2010) and engage in more
discussion with peers across a range of contexts (Gerber et al.
2012; Hibbing et al. 2011; Mondak 2010), and in larger social
networks (Mondak et al. 2010). Because of the highly social
nature of the extroverted individual, she may be more prone
to seek information, in large part due to the fact that she
wants to be able to talk to people and wants to have things to
talk about (Mondak 2010)—this includes having informa-
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tion about opposing views when she encounters disagree-
able viewpoints. As with open personalities, we expect those
scoring high in extroversion to display greater information
seeking-behavior in response to disagreement.
Agreeable citizens are highly concerned with having pos-
itive relations with others, with avoiding conﬂict, and with
collaborating when differences arise (Mondak 2010). They
seek to avoid conﬂict wherever possible, and perceive high
social costs from disagreement. Interpersonal disagreement
presents an uncomfortable situation that is to be avoided—
as a result, the agreeable are less likely to discuss politics
with close social ties (Gerber et al. 2012). Thus, when con-
fronted with disagreement, we expect an agreeable citizen
to “shut down” and not engage in additional information-
seeking behavior.
We do not have strong theoretical expectations for how
the remaining two Big 5 personality types—conscientious-
ness and emotional stability—may guide individuals in their
responses to interpersonal disagreement; thus, we do not
consider them further in this article. It is fairly common in
personality research to have expectations for a subset of per-
sonality types but not for all ﬁve (see, e.g., Mondak 2010).1
STUDY 1: PRIMING POLITICAL DISAGREEMENT
IN AN EXPERIMENT
We ﬁrst test the moderating effects of personality via an
experiment administered using Amazon Mechanical Turk,
one uniquely suited to examining the aforementioned hy-
potheses. Amazon Mechanical Turk is an interface that
allows Amazon users to perform tasks online for money,
making it a cost-effective and efﬁcient way to administer ex-
periments. Further, MTurk produces samples that are more
representative of the US population than student samples and
other in-person convenience samples (Berinsky, Huber, and
Lenz 2012), which are the standard for much experimental
work.
Our study began with a pretreatment questionnaire that
included a personality battery, after which participants were
randomly assigned into one of three experimental condi-
tions.2 Two conditions were designed to prime participants
to think about either agreement or disagreement from their
own social network; the third group was a control, so re-
spondents were asked no social network items. In treatment
conditions each respondent was administrated an “impor-
tant matters” (Marsden 1987) name generator and asked to
provide up to three discussants. After providing these names,
participants were then asked to identify which of the named
persons they most agreed (agreement condition) or disagreed
with (disagreement condition). In order to ensure the salience
of the agreement or disagreement prime, participants were
asked how much they either agree or disagree with the named
individual on two issues (one economic and one social). These
primes represent the experimental stimulus for participants
in the treatment groups.
The goal of this experimental prime is to get people to
think about social interactions and then to test the inﬂu-
ence of such social considerations outside the context of an
actual/immediate encounter. Priming these “relationship
schemas” allows us to assess the effects of individual net-
work encounters—effects that people may not be cognitively
aware of (e.g., Baldwin, Carrell, and Lopez 1990). When
people discuss politics with individuals in their network
with whom they disagree, it is unlikely that the effects are
immediate and limited to the duration of the conversation.
Rather, people engage in a conversation that raises a set of
internal reactions (reactions that presumably endure be-
yond the conclusion of the discussion), as Ahn et al. (2014,
11) note: “inﬂuence occurs not only when individuals are
persuaded to change their preferences in response to diver-
gent information but also when individuals must ‘counter-
argue’—either socially or internally.” Priming respondents to
think about disagreement in their networks is designed to
mimic the enduring effects of disagreement and the ways in
which exposure to parts of a network can structure the ways
that people process the political world around them.3
Following the pretest questionnaire and the adminis-
tration of the treatment, each participant was exposed to a
simulated campaign environment of our own making; this
was patterned on Lau and Redlawsk’s (1997, 2006) dynamic
process-tracing approach. The environment consists of a
scrolling information board that presents the participant
with a series of boxes; these boxes are labeled to indicate
whether they contain issue or background information about
a candidate and to signal to which parties’ candidate they
pertain (red boxes for the Republican, blue for the Demo-
crat). The participant can click on these items to read more
information about a topic in a pop-up window (see the ﬁfth
section of the appendix, available online for the campaign
informational content). As she reads the information in a
pop-up, other boxes continue to scroll down the screen in
the background, imposing costs and tradeoffs for choosing to
1. Our expectations are summarized in table 1 of the appendix, avail-
able online. Please see the appendix for robustness checks, alternative model
speciﬁcations, and additional discussion.
2. Our study is diagrammed in ﬁgure 3 of the appendix.
3. Please see the appendix for a manipulation check/discussion of the
effectiveness of the manipulations.
Volume 78 Number 3 July 2016 / 809
read one piece of information over another (this is intended
to reﬂect the choices that individuals must make during real
campaigns (Lau and Redlawsk 1997, 2006). The simulated
campaign takes place for 15 minutes. Importantly, we record
much of the participants’ behavior in this environment via a
data drop, allowing us to assess a host of elements about
information searching in light of experimental conditions.
Following the simulated campaign, the participant responds
to a voting section where they report perceptions of the can-
didates and make a decision.
VARIABLES AND MEASUREMENT
Given our interest in electoral information seeking, our
dependent variable is the number of items that respondents
accessed during the campaign. This measures the depth of
the information search and is simply a sum of the number
of boxes that the participant clicked on during the course
of the simulated campaign (Huang and Price 2001; Jacoby
et al. 1976; Lau and Redlawsk 2006; Redlawsk 2004).4 Par-
ticipants who want more information (i.e., those who are
exhibiting greater information-seeking behavior) have to
click on more of the boxes that arise during the simulated
campaign; we are able to capture this behavior with a count
of the number of boxes that are opened. One concern that
arises with such a measure is that participants may not be
taking the task seriously or may be clicking on items ran-
domly. To this end, we have removed the few “extreme” par-
ticipants—that is, those who accessed fewer than 10 items
or (the one person) who accessed 150 items during the sim-
ulated campaign. While we are certain that some variation
in attention/effort exists among participants, the random
assignment to conditions should produce similar quantities
of noise across conditions, allowing us to assess treatment
effects (despite such behavior). If anything, participants click-
ing on items in an uninterested or random fashion should
make it harder to ﬁnd treatment effects and to show that
personality moderates these effects.
The personality items consist of 10 questions that are used
to construct ﬁve variables, two for each of the “Big 5” types.
The use of 10 trait pairs—commonly called the “Ten-Item
Personality Inventory” or TIPI—to capture the Big 5 per-
sonality types has become common in the study of personal-
ity and political behavior (e.g., Gerber, Huber, Doherty, Dow-
ling, and Ha 2010). The 10 questions ask the participant about
the extent to which a pair of traits applies to them on a 7-point
scale ranging from strongly disagree to strongly agree. For
example, the measure of extroversion is constructed from a
question asking the participant the extent to which “extro-
verted, enthusiastic” as well as “reserved, quiet” applies to
them. In this example, the second trait pair is designed to
capture the low end of the extroversion dimension. Given this
two-pair approach, we reverse code the second trait pair (so
that high values are extroverted and low values are reserved)
and add it to the “extroverted, enthusiastic” pair. Thus, our
extroverted measure is “extroverted, enthusiastic” added to
reverse coded “reserved, quiet.” Measures of the remaining
personality types are constructed in a similar fashion. For the
agreeableness variable, the trait pairs “sympathetic, warm”
and “critical, quarrelsome” are used. Finally, the openness to
experiences measure contains questions regarding “open to
new experiences, complex” and “conventional, uncreative.”5
RANDOMIZATION CHECK
We ﬁrst present the results of a randomization check to
determine the degree to which assignment was successful in
achieving balance across conditions for all of the personality
items, as well as for the major characteristics of education,
strength of partisanship, age, and political knowledge. A total
of 212 participants were recruited to participate in the ex-
periment. As noted, we removed several observations who
were (extreme) outliers on the dependent variable; such in-
dividuals either accessed so much information that they could
not have possibly been reading it/paying attention, or they
accessed less than 10 items (meaning that they did not take
the task seriously). This reduces our observations to 202. Ta-
ble 1 shows the mean values on items across the three ex-
perimental conditions. We use analysis of variance models to
assess the signiﬁcance of the differences between conditions,
ﬁnding that the randomization largely eliminated differences.
The only item for which we observe a signiﬁcant difference
is political knowledge. As a result, we include this covariate
as a control in all of the following analyses for this experi-
ment (to ensure that differences in knowledge levels between
conditions are not driving any results).
EXPERIMENTAL RESULTS
First, we present baseline models with no personality items
or interactions; these show the effects of the treatment
conditions on the respondent’s depth of search during the
simulated campaign. While we do not have theoretical
4. Please see the appendix for analysis of an alternative dependent
variable: average time spent with a piece of information. We ﬁnd com-
plementary results to the “depth” estimates—personality traits interact
with disagreement to not only condition the amount of information that
respondents access but the amount of time that they spend with accessed
information.
5. Alpha scale reliability coefﬁcients for these items are as follows:
Extroversion p .78, openness to experience p .62, agreeableness p .52.
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priors on the agreement condition, we present the effects of
both the disagreement and agreement conditions. The con-
trol condition becomes the baseline, and the coefﬁcient es-
timates for agreement and disagreement represent the effect
of each of these treatments relative to the control. As noted
previously, we account for political knowledge, as the ran-
domization procedure failed to achieve balance across con-
ditions on this variable.
Table 2 displays the negative binomial regression esti-
mates, which explore the causal effects of the disagreement
(and agreement) primes for information seeking.6 The ev-
idence in this table both supports our expectations and sur-
prises us. First, information seeking is indeed stimulated in
the disagreement condition. This result is consistent with
research by McPhee et al. (1963), Mutz (2006), and other
studies mentioned previously. Throughout our analyses, we
use one-tailed tests as we have strong directional hypoth-
eses with respect to disagreement and personality; we ﬁnd
results that are signiﬁcant at both the p ! .05 and p ! .1
levels of signiﬁcance. The disagreement coefﬁcient is sig-
niﬁcant at the p ! .1 level. Those in the disagreement con-
dition access roughly ﬁve more items (41.6 items in the
control condition vs. 46.4 items in the disagreement con-
dition) over the course of the simulated campaign.
Second, and interestingly, we ﬁnd that the same effect
occurs in the agreement condition. The magnitude of the
effect is similar to that for disagreement—we observe an
increase of about ﬁve items accessed (41.6 in the control
condition vs. 46.1 in the agreement condition). Previous
Table 2. A First Look at Treatment Effects,
Campaign Experiment
Depth of Search
(Number of Items Accessed)
Disagreement prime .110**
(.072)
Agreement prime .101**
(.071)
Political knowledge .001
(.001)
Constant 3.60*
(.092)
N 202
Note. Negative binomial regression estimates, one-tailed. Model is sta-
tistically signiﬁcant (LR x2 test).
* p ! .05.
** p ! .1.
Table 1. Descriptives by Experimental Condition
Depth of Search (Number of Campaign Items Accessed)
Mean SD Min Max
Experiment 1: September 2011
Depth of search (DV) 43.09 17.95 10 132
Respondent Characteristics (by Condition)
Control Agreement Before Disagreement Before Signiﬁcance
Experiment 1: September 2011
Extroversion 6.12 5.51 5.51
Openness 8.49 9.07 8.58
Agreeableness 8.65 8.61 8.49
Education 3.30 3.42 3.51
Strength of party ID 1.26 1.39 1.26
Age 31.1 32.8 33.4
Political knowledge 66.1 73.7 80.1 *
Note. DV p dependent variable; SD p standard deviation.
* p ! .05, F-test.
6. Poisson estimation was not used due to the dependent variable
being overdispersed (Long 1997).
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research does not provide clear expectations with respect to
the agreement condition and the control group, though the
implication of the McPhee model is that agreement is the
opposite of disagreement. So although the disagreement
hypothesis is conﬁrmed, the observed agreement effect leads
us to consider other potential explanations for our results.
It is possible that priming any part of a network en-
courages subjects to consider the mix of political consid-
erations from social contacts. And this could play out in (at
least) three different ways. One potential explanation is that
both primes get subjects to think about both agreement and
disagreement. This seems unlikely given these are core net-
works characterized by generally agreeable interactions.
Also, because the participants were asked about the relative
position of agreeable/disagreeable discussants on economic
and social issues, we can test the levels of agreement/dis-
agreement that were produced by the primes. The mean
level of disagreement for those who received the disagree-
ment prime was 2.4 on social issues and 2.1 for economic
issues—this translates into roughly “a little” or “some” dis-
agreement. The mean level of agreement for those who re-
ceived the agreement prime was 2.9 for social issues and 3.1
for economic issues; that is roughly “some” agreement on
these issues.
Accordingly, two other possibilities seem more likely to
us. First, it is possible that agreement can stimulate infor-
mation search but that it usually does not. The idea here is
that because agreement is usually assumed by people in
regular interactions (e.g., Huckfeldt and Sprague 1995), it is
the norm and therefore does not lead to more engagement
with the information environment. In this experiment, we
have done something people do not usually do—we went
out of our way to emphasize agreement. Second, it is pos-
sible that network effects in the realm of information seek-
ing do not depend upon the substance of conversations.
Although previous observational research on the effects of
disagreement in other areas would suggest that the ﬁrst
interpretation is more likely, we can see some potential for
the second explanation in our experimental data.
We next present the results of models testing the mod-
erating effects of personality on the relationship between
disagreement and the depth of electoral information seek-
ing. All of the models follow the same structure: we in-
clude both the disagreement and agreement prime variables
(as well as the political knowledge control) along with one
personality item and one interaction between the person-
ality item and the disagreement/agreement prime.7 Thus,
for each personality item we show two models: an inter-
action with the disagreement prime (which is our primary
substantive interest) and a model with the personality item
interacted with the agreement prime (which is presented
for comparison). All models are negative binomials, and
table 3 displays the results.
Because we are most concerned with the moderating
effect of personality on disagreement (as it relates to infor-
mation seeking), we focus our attention on the interactions,
not solely the effect of personality.8 Recall from table 2 that
there is a signiﬁcant relationship between the disagreement
prime and the depth of search variable (with a positive co-
efﬁcient). Introducing the interaction between disagreement
and personality traits complicates this—altogether, the results
are consistent with the idea that personality traits moderate
the impact of interpersonal disagreement. Speciﬁcally, they
are consistent with our hypotheses that disagreement effects
on information seeking depend on subjects’ personalities.
To fully interpret these conditional effects, in ﬁgure 1 we
plot the marginal effects of the disagreement prime across
the full range of the personality measures. We are interested
both in the magnitude of the effect, as well as the range of
the moderating variables across which we have a relationship
that is different from zero (e.g., Berry, Golder, and Milton
2012). As our main focus is on disagreement (vs. agreement),
we only show interaction plots for the disagreement inter-
actions. In ﬁgure 1, we plot the marginal effect lines (notably,
these are not ﬂat). But rather than display conﬁdence inter-
vals, below the x-axis we provide the reader with the z-scores
of the marginal effect at each of the values of the moderat-
ing personality measure. We take this tack because we are
using one-tailed tests in the tables (as we have directional
hypotheses); rather than display conﬁdence intervals given
one-tailed tests, we present z-scores to allow the reader to
draw her own conclusions about the statistical signiﬁcance
of the marginal effect across the range of the personality
measures. While a z-score of greater than or equal to 1.29 is
statistically signiﬁcant at the 90% conﬁdence level using a
one-tailed test, here we believe that showing the raw test
statistics is a useful and transparent approach. Importantly,
7. As a robustness check, we reestimated each model with a speciﬁca-
tion that included all of the Big 5 personality traits simultaneously. These
results are substantively similar to those presented here. For full estimates
and a discussion, please see the ﬁrst section of the appendix.
8. To be fair, we would note that establishing causality with interac-
tion terms in an experimental framework is not always straightforward.
Interacting the treatment (disagreement prime) with pretreatment char-
acteristics of the participants (personality) can produce treatment effect
heterogeneity, which is typically only indirect evidence of the causal mod-
eration, unless one makes strong assumptions regarding the nature of the
relationship between the pretreatment covariates and the average direct
effect of the treatment (Imai et al. 2011).
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in addition to the z-scores, we also show a histogram of the
distribution of observations across the personality variables
(e.g., Berry et al. 2012); this is again intended to help the
reader draw her own (substantive) conclusions, as it shows
that these measures are not evenly distributed, and that where
we have more observations we tend to see stronger effects.
The results largely conﬁrm our expectations. Looking ﬁrst
at the extroversion plot, we see a positive moderating effect
on the disagreement prime. That is, when confronted with
disagreement, the extroverted seek out more information
than the reserved/introverted. For those who are reserved,
we observe no effect of the disagreement prime—such indi-
viduals do not engage in a deeper information search when
confronted with socially supplied disagreement. However,
as one becomes increasingly extroverted, the disagreement
prime becomes more consequential for information seeking,
and for those who are higher on this scale there is a statis-
tically signiﬁcant marginal effect of disagreement. This aligns
with our expectations regarding extroversion and offers ev-
idence to suggest that the effects of disagreement are indeed
moderated by individual traits. Further, this change from a
null effect for the reserved to a positive and signiﬁcant effect
for the extroverted does not appear to be driven by the dis-
tribution of the personality measure.
Turning to the openness to experience plot, a similar
story emerges. Again, we see that there is a positive mar-
ginal effect, suggesting that those who are characterized by
openness to experience respond to disagreement with more
information-seeking behavior compared to those who are
more “closed.” For those who are closed there is no effect of
Table 3. Disagree/Agree Prime, Personality, and Depth of Search, Campaign Experiment
Negative Binomial Regression Estimates
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Disagreement prime 2.039 .117** 2.117 .110* .326 .109**
(.141) (.073) (.265) (.072) (.264) (.073)
Agreement prime .102** .016 .085 2.137 2.109 2.109
(.071) (.135) (.072) (.259) (.254) (.252)
Extroversion .005 .007 … … … …
(.012) (.013)
Extroversion # disagree before .028** … … … … …
(.021)
Extroversion # agree before … .015 … … … …
(.020)
Openness … … .011 .010 … …
(.015) (.015)
Openness # disagree before … … .026 … … …
(.030)
Openness # agree before … … … .024 … …
(.028)
Agreeableness … … … … 2.013 2.031
(.016) (.017)
Agreeableness # disagree before … … … … 2.025 …
(.030)
Agreeableness # agree before … … … … … .026
(.028)
Political knowledge .001 .001 .001 .001 .001 .001
(.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001) (.001)
Constant 3.58* 3.55* 3.50* 3.50* 3.71* 3.88*
(.125) (.125) (.163) (.161) (.178) (.184)
N 199 199 199 199 195 195
Note. One-tailed; all models are statistically signiﬁcant (LR x2 tests).
* p ! .05.
** p ! .1.
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disagreement on depth of search, but as openness increases,
so does information-seeking behavior. For those who are
on the upper third of the openness scale, there is a signif-
icant marginal effect with a one-tailed test (at the 90% level,
though a couple of places on the scale achieve signiﬁcance
at higher thresholds). Looking at the histogram, we see that
observations are not evenly distributed across this person-
ality measure; rather, they are clustered in the upper one-
half of the variable. However, it is also worth noting the low
numbers of observations for those who are closed is not
what is driving the effect. That is, even if we focus entirely
on the portion of the personality measure where we have
observations, it appears that the conditioning effect exists.
Those who are in the middle of the measure (who might
perhaps be characterized as neither open or closed) do not
respond to disagreement with deeper searches, but those
who are on the higher end (certainly characterized as open
to experience) respond with greater information seeking.
Observing signiﬁcant results across the range of the mod-
erating variable where we have observations makes us more
conﬁdent in concluding that the marginal effect plot offers
supportive evidence (e.g., Berry et al. 2012).
Finally, for agreeableness, we observe a negative inter-
active effect (as hypothesized). Looking at those who are
disagreeable, we see that there is a signiﬁcant and positive
effect of the disagreement prime, but that this effect di-
minishes and eventually disappears for those who are in-
creasingly agreeable. Again, we see that respondents are not
evenly distributed across the measure. However, focusing
on the range of the personality variable where we do have a
sizeable number of observations, we see this moderating
effect emerge. For the most agreeable individuals, there is
no effect of the disagreement prime on information-seeking
behavior, but for those who are in the middle of the dis-
Figure 1. Personality, disagreement, and depth of search (campaign experiment). Panel A shows how extroversion moderates, panel B shows how
openness moderates, and panel C shows how agreeableness moderates. Two pieces of information are shown below the x-axis. The ﬁrst is the z-score
of the marginal effect at that value of personality measure. The second—beneath the z-scores—is a histogram showing the distribution of the personality
measure. We are not showing traditional conﬁdence intervals as we are evaluating the effects with one-tailed tests (see table 4); in the interest of allowing
the reader to evaluate signiﬁcance levels for herself, we present the plots (notably, none of the lines are ﬂat), the z-scores at different levels of the
conditioning variable (i.e., the personality item) and the distribution of the raw data.
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tribution (i.e., those who we might characterize as neither
agreeable nor disagreeable), a signiﬁcant and positive effect
exists.
In sum, the picture with respect to our experimental as-
sessment of disagreement, personality, and information seek-
ing is generally supportive of our expectations. We ﬁnd that
personality moderates the relationship between disagreement
and information seeking about politics. Personality appears
to structure the ways in which people respond to disagree-
ment, and speciﬁcally, in how they then respond by either
seeking out new information, or by not seeking out addi-
tional information. Openness to experience and extrover-
sion predispose the citizen to behave much as McPhee et al.
(1963) posited (with an increased information search). Con-
versely, agreeableness appears to produce a very different
kind of effect; when confronted with disagreement, the agree-
able individual shuts down and searches for less informa-
tion than her disagreeable counterpart.
OBSERVATIONAL DESIGN: THE 2008–2009 ANES
PANEL STUDY
While the experimental results present consistent and com-
pelling evidence, we acknowledge that questions remain about
the degree to which these ﬁndings generalize beyond the ex-
perimental setting. To begin to address these concerns, we
employ observational data from the 2008–9 American Na-
tional Election Panel Study. The 2008–9 ANES is well suited
for testing the hypotheses presented here for several reasons.
First, it contains an egocentric discussion network battery
(wave 9) with a question asking about the extent to which a
respondent disagrees with her named discussants. With this
information we are able to create a measure of the average
amount of network disagreement to which a respondent is
exposed.
Second, while the 2008–9 ANES does not include a bat-
tery of personality items, the ANES 2010 Panel Re-Contact
Study is a re-interview of the 2008–9 ANES Panel respon-
dents and does include such a battery. Since personality
traits “exhibit tremendous stability over time” (Mondak 2010,
5)—and evidence of trait stability is widespread (Winter
and Barenbaum 1999; Allen 1994)—the observed personal-
ity traits that are recorded in the June 2010 Panel Re-contact
Study should be good measures of the personality charac-
teristics held by respondents during their interviews in Sep-
tember and November of 2008.
Finally, we have measures of the desire to seek informa-
tion in wave 10 of the 2008–9 ANES. Since the network dis-
agreement questions are in wave 9, we have temporal order-
ing where we are measuring disagreement ﬁrst and then the
outcome of information seeking about politics second. As is
typical with survey data of this sort, we cannot say for certain
that disagreement preceded the desire to seek information,
but our setup is at least suggestive of such a dynamic.
To construct the measures of network disagreement, we
use the aforementioned egocentric network battery from
wave 9 of the 2008–9 ANES. Each main respondent is asked
to name up to three discussants and to report on a number
of characteristics of these individuals. We use the question
asking the respondent “How different the opinions” of the
discussant are from his or her own. This creates a measure
of disagreement between the main respondent and each
discussant. We then sum the amount of disagreement with
each individual across all reported discussants, and divide
by the number of discussants to create a measure of the
average level of disagreement in the respondent’s discussion
network. The measure ranges from 0 to 1, where 0 is no
disagreement with any of the reported discussants and 1 is
a lot of disagreement with all of the named discussants.9
The personality measures in the 2010 Panel Re-Contact
Study use the same 10-question battery employed in our
experiment. The variables were constructed in the same
fashion, where each personality trait is constructed from
two summed trait pair questions (one of which is ﬁrst re-
verse coded). Since we are interested in the moderating
effects on personality on the relationship between disagree-
ment and several outcomes, we interact average network
disagreement with the personality measures, as was done in
the experiment.10
The dependent variable we use to capture respondents’
desire to seek information comes from wave 10 of the 2008–
9 ANES. Speciﬁcally, we use a question asking about the
respondent’s level of interest in information about govern-
ment and politics. The measure is coded from 0 to 4, where 0
is “not interested at all” and 4 is “extremely interested.”
While not a perfect representation of information-seeking
behavior as measured in our experiment, it does capture the
desire to learn and presumably acquire information (please
see the second section of the appendix for an exploration
of an alternate dependent variable using the 2008–9 ANES).
9. We use a “general disagreement” measure vs. a “partisan dis-
agreement” measure (Klofstad et al. 2013). The results are substantively
similar, regardless of approach. While the general disagreement measure
captures disagreement with all discussion partners on a 1–5 scale, we have
recoded each to range from 0 to 1 (hence the distribution of the network
average ranges from 0 to 1).
10. Please see the third section of the appendix for a discussion of the
extent to which personality traits may drive levels of individual exposure
to disagreement. An analysis provides some evidence that agreeableness
may reduce the amount of disagreement in one’s network (as we might
expect), but we do not ﬁnd an association between openness or extro-
version and network disagreement.
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We estimate these models using OLS regression, adding
controls for strength of partisanship, political knowledge,
education, gender, age, and income.11
2008–2009 ANES RESULTS
The left-most column of table 4 shows the direct effect of
network disagreement (wave 9) on interest in information
(wave 10). We continue using one-tailed tests of signiﬁcance
(as we are testing the same directional hypotheses), though
we place more emphasis on the 95% conﬁdence level given
the number of observations afforded by the ANES.
Looking at the table, we see that network disagreement
has a signiﬁcant and positive effect on interest in informa-
tion seeking, as suggested by classic theories of social in-
ﬂuence (McPhee et al. 1963; Sprague 1982). The direct result
resembles what we saw previously—the effect on informa-
tion seeking is similar to the depth of search dependent
variable in the experiment. In short, the survey results from
the 2008–9 ANES suggest that network disagreement in-
creases interest in information about government and poli-
11. Strength of partisanship is taken from wave 9 and ranges from 0 to
3 (0 p independent, 3 p strong partisan). Political knowledge is con-
structed from a wave 11 battery. While there are 12 knowledge items, we
use only the ﬁrst six (W11V1–W11V6), due to missing data on the last six
(W11V7–W11V12).
Table 4. Disagreement and the Moderating Effects of Personality Traits, 2008–2009 ANES
DV: “Interest in Information”
(1) (2) (3) (4)
Network disagreement .361* .076 .594** 1.07*
(.095) (.288) (.439) (.453)
Extroversion … .038* … …
(.014)
Extroversion # disagreement … .032 … …
(.041)
Openness to experience … … .080* …
(.017)
Openness # disagreement … … 2.038 …
(.050)
Agreeableness … … … .041*
(.018)
Agreeableness # disagreement … … … 2.090*
(.050)
Strength of partisanship .035 .029 .012 .023
(.022) (.027) (.027) (.027)
Political knowledge .159* .138* .137* .131*
(.022) (.028) (.028) (.028)
Education .069* .079* .064* .085*
(.021) (.027) (.027) (.027)
Gender (male p 1) .013 .032 .002 .018
(.041) (.052) (.051) (.054)
Age .012* .012* .012* .011*
(.006) (.002) (.002) (.002)
Income .012* .006 .009 .008
(.006) (.007) (.007) (.007)
Constant .750* .697* .308* .634*
(.128) (.195) (.219) (.227)
N 2,241 1,411 1,411 1,410
R2 .11 .11 .11 .09
Note. Ordinary least-squares regression estimates, one-tailed. DV p dependent variable.
* p ! .05.
** p ! .10.
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tics. We would note that these observational data do not
contain a great parallel for the agreement condition included
in our experiment (and we are acutely aware of differences in
our dependent variable)—thus, we are cautious in discussing
how agreement and disagreement may contrast in this anal-
ysis. However, based on the results from the average dis-
agreement measure, we might surmise that when agreement
is not explicitly primed—that is, when it is the default, or
norm—that it does not produce the same kinds of infor-
mation seeking effects.
How does personality moderate the relationship between
disagreement and (our indicator of) political information
seeking in these observational data? Estimates are reported
in the other columns of table 4—of particular interest are the
coefﬁcients on the “personality trait # disagreement” in-
teractions. Figure 2 graphs the marginal effect of network
disagreement on interest in information across the full range
of values for extroversion, openness to experience, and agree-
ableness (once again we see that these lines are not ﬂat). As
before, we provide the z-scores and a histogram showing the
distribution of the personality measure to assist the reader in
drawing her own conclusions (z-scores greater than or equal
to 1.65 are statistically signiﬁcant at the 95% conﬁdence level
with a one-tailed test). We see that there are signiﬁcant mod-
erating effects for all three personality types at some range of
their values. For both extroversion and agreeableness we ﬁnd
evidence supporting our hypotheses—evidence that is also
consistent with the results of the experiment. As individuals
score higher on extroversion, the effect of disagreement on
interest in information increases. The extrovert responds to
disagreement with greater interest in information relative to
the introvert; the interaction is statistically signiﬁcant for just
over half the range of the measure. And as we observed in
the experimental results, the shift from an insigniﬁcant effect
Figure 2. Personality, disagreement, and “interest in information” (2008–2009 ANES). Panel A shows how extroversion moderates, panel B shows how
openness moderates, and panel C shows how agreeableness moderates. Two pieces of information are shown below the x-axis. The ﬁrst is the z-score of the
marginal effect at that value of personality measure. The second—beneath the z-scores—is a histogram showing the distribution of the personality measure.
We are not showing traditional conﬁdence intervals as we are evaluating the effects with one-tailed tests (see table 4); in the interest of allowing the reader
to evaluate signiﬁcance levels for herself, we present the plots (notably, none of the lines are ﬂat), the z-scores at different levels of the conditioning variable
(i.e., the personality item), and the distribution of the raw data.
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for the reserved to a signiﬁcant effect for the more extro-
verted does not appear to be driven solely by the distribution
of the personality item.
Also consistent with the experimental ﬁndings, agree-
ableness exerts a negative effect on the relationship between
disagreement and interest in information. As an individual
scores higher on this measure, there is a decreasing effect of
disagreement on interest in information. The interaction
effect is signiﬁcant for most of the range—from the mini-
mum value of agreeableness (0) to about 10 on the scale. For
the highly agreeable (those scoring above 10), disagreement
does not appear to engender any signiﬁcant effects on in-
terest in information. This is again suggestive of the notion
that the agreeable citizen shuts down when confronted with
disagreement, as their predispositions toward maintaining
harmony and avoiding conﬂict override any desires to en-
gage in further political exchange. Because a relatively large
number of respondents classiﬁed themselves as highly agree-
able, it appears that the lack of a signiﬁcant effect here is
likely a real moderating effect (and not an artifact of the dis-
tribution of the measure).
Contrary to our expectations and the ﬁndings from the
simulated campaign experiment, we observe a negative mod-
erating effect for openness to experience. The negative inter-
action effect is signiﬁcant from roughly 3 to 9 on the open-
ness scale (i.e., for much of the middle range). This suggests
that as individuals become increasingly open, that they re-
spond to disagreement with decreasing interest in informa-
tion. Although caution is warranted (and we must reject our
directional hypothesis in these observational data), it appears
that for this personality trait there is a possible disconnect
between the lab and the outside world—what happens in ex-
perimental settings where the open seek more information
(through a deeper search in response to a prime) may be dis-
tinct from reported political behavior during an actual pres-
idential campaign. There could be numerous reasons for this
difference between the experimental and survey results (e.g.,
measurement/the DV used); more research is clearly needed
to resolve this discrepancy.
DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSION
We began our inquiry with hypotheses about three person-
ality traits; for two of these—extroversion and agreeable-
ness—we ﬁnd consistent evidence between our experimental
and observational analyses. Disagreement drives information
seeking/interest in information, and extroversion appears to
increase this relationship, while agreeableness appears to de-
crease it. Although we ﬁnd contradictory results for openness
to experience when we look at the lab versus survey settings,
the experimental result is consistent with our hypothesis.
Overall, we feel comfortable claiming that the patterns
identiﬁed in our simulated campaign generally ﬁnd support
in observational accounts of everyday political interaction—
that is, in responses to network disagreement measured in a
nation-wide sample, across a presidential election. We gain
purchase on questions of causality by demonstrating effects
in the experimental setting, but we also demonstrate that
these effects have some claim to external validity by pairing
them with survey data. Whether people are randomly primed
to think about socially supplied disagreement—or whether
we use their survey reports on individuals’ discussion part-
ners—we observe consistent evidence that different types of
citizens respond differently to disagreement. That is, person-
ality appears to guide the individual in his or her responses
to disagreement and, speciﬁcally, her responses as they per-
tain to political information seeking.
A concern with the 2008–9 ANES analysis—and one that
accompanies many observational designs—is the presence of
endogeneity. It is possible that interest in information about
politics could be (at least partially) driving network compo-
sition, with those who have greater levels of interest being
more prone to discuss politics with diverse groups of people.
Our ability to address this problem thoroughly is somewhat
limited, for we do not have measures of networks and in-
terest across multiple waves of the study; this would allow
us to estimate cross-lagged effects (e.g., Finkel 1995). That
said, we do have temporal ordering (network items appear in
wave 9, the interest DV in wave 10) and multiple measures
of the dependent variable. Importantly, in additional speci-
ﬁcations we ﬁnd that the effect of disagreement on interest
holds when we control for respondents’ previous levels of
interest. Thus, while we would cede that there is likely some
reciprocal inﬂuence between networks and interest, these
robustness checks give us conﬁdence that the direction of the
relationship is not wholly reversed from that which we have
posited here.
Socially supplied disagreement has the potential to play
a powerful role in the lives of ordinary citizens. In the pres-
ent effort, we have addressed the ways in which different
types of individuals may respond in the face of disagree-
ment. In addition, we have focused on the consequences for
information-seeking behavior during campaigns, given the
importance of such dynamics for the quality of decision
making (Lau and Redlawsk 2006).
In thinking about questions of quality, civic capacity,
and process, it is worth noting that these results hold impli-
cations for aspects of the “democratic dilemma” posed by
Mutz (2006). Our results suggest that the experience of dis-
agreement is neither a social good nor a social bad, at least
with respect to information-seeking behavior. Instead, dis-
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agreement should be viewed as a factor that shapes the char-
acter of mass politics—one that does so depending on the
distribution of personalities in the population and the prob-
ability of encountering disagreement. For example, to the ex-
tent that more extroverts and people “open to experience”
are exposed to disagreement, we might expect to see a more
deliberative public. At the same time, to the extent we see
more agreeable individuals exposed to disagreement, we might
expect to see less information seeking and exchange—the
latter example might be thought of as being compatible with
a more partisan public seeking more representation in pol-
itics. More generally, our work joins recent efforts (e.g., Testa
et al. 2014) in calling attention to heterogeneity; this suggests
that disagreement should not be seen as something that has
mixed consequences for all individuals—it may hold negative
consequences for some, but it may hold positive (or mixed,
or effectively no real) consequences for others. Such a view
of disagreement points away from clear societal trade-offs
and toward the expectation that we should observe a blend
of representational, deliberative and participatory democracy.
Of course, while our effort addresses several questions, it
also raises a number of others. First, we ﬁnd a discrepancy
in the way in which openness to experience conditions the
relationship between disagreement and information—the
results reverse across the experimental and survey settings.
Individuals characterized as being “open” respond to dis-
agreement with a deeper and lengthier search in our sim-
ulated campaign but are predicted to have less interest in in-
formation when we examine their behavior during an actual
election cycle. While we can only speculate at this point, the
difference could be a function of different dependent var-
iables. Future research could help clarify why we see such dif-
ferences and help point ways forward.
Second, we have focused our attention on information
seeking about politics and on two measures of such behav-
ior—the depth of search in the simulated campaign and
interest in information about politics in the survey-based
analysis. We have explored some additional dependent var-
iables that tap into information-seeking behavior, and these
results can be found in the second section of the appendix.
The general pattern of results presented here largely holds
for the other measures we have examined, but we would note
that there are many potential outcomes that one could ex-
amine, including items that get at “correct” voting (e.g., Lau
and Redlaswk 1997). Indeed, one implication of our results
is that some kinds of people may make “better” choices at
the ballot box when exposed to heterogeneous views, while
others may make worse decisions (see also Ryan 2011; Sokhey
and McClurg 2012). Future work should look more closely
at heterogeneous responses to disagreement as they relate to
the quality of decision making itself, along with other out-
comes such as persuasion (e.g., Ryan 2013).
Third, geographic variation in the aggregate distribution
of personality types (Plaut, Markus, and Lachman 2002; Rent-
frow 2010; Rentfrow, Gosling, and Potter 2008) suggests that
personality may drive very different kinds of social interac-
tions across different contexts. If personality inﬂuences re-
sponses to disagreement (as it pertains to information seek-
ing), but if networks are composed predominantly of one
personality-type or another in different locales, then the im-
plications of disagreement for democratic citizenship may be
subject to contextual constraints. For example, information
seeking could be the modal response to disagreement in the
Northeast (where extroversion is more common; Rentfrow
2010) but may not be so in other places. Much of the data
used in the study of social networks and social inﬂuence have
come from community studies, and there could be additional
beneﬁts to similar designs (in that such information may be
“richer”). Of course, such studies would also raise the pos-
sibility that observed responses to disagreement and per-
sonality may differ were the same study conducted in the
Northeast, Paciﬁc coast, or the Midwest; South Bend, Indiana,
could produce different inferences on these dimensions than
Elmira, New York.
As a ﬁnal note, we return to democratic implications
and would again underscore the potential signiﬁcance of
our ﬁndings. Personality-based moderation means that some
may be better able to acquire information, that some may be
more susceptible to persuasion, and as noted, that some may
be predisposed to be better deliberative participants. These
differences between people—in how they approach the po-
litical world and in the social sources that supply them with
information—are fundamental to our understanding of dem-
ocratic citizenship (Lau and Redlawsk 2006). Disagreement
is not treated the same by all; additional information seek-
ing happens for some but not others. Our conclusions do
not call into question previous theories regarding disagree-
ment and social inﬂuence (e.g., McPhee et al. 1963)—in fact,
we ﬁnd much support for them. Rather, our study adds nu-
ance and builds on these foundations to promote an under-
standing of the circumstances under which disagreement
has the potential to produce better citizens and of those
circumstances under which it does not.
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